Juror anonymity was unknown to American common law and jurisprudence in the countrys first two centuries. Anonymity was first employed in federal prosecutions of organized crime in New York in the 1980's. Although anonymous juries are unusual since they are typically only empanelled in organized-crime cases, its use has spread more recently to widely publicized cases, such as the federal prosecution of police officers accused of beating Rodney King and the trial of those accused of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
In these cases, attorneys selected a jury from a panel of prospective jurors whose names, addresses, ethnic backgrounds and religious affiliations remained unknown to either side. This unorthodox procedure, designed to protect jurors from outside influence and the fear of retaliation, has occasionally been employed in
New York federal courts since the trial of drug kingpin Leroy "Nicky" Barnes. Despite apparent benefits, critics assail anonymous juries on the grounds that they are an infringement of the sixth amendment guarantee of an impartial jury and because they present a serious and unnecessary erosion of the presumption of innocence.
Since many attorneys believe trials are frequently won or lost during jury selection, any procedure diminishing the role of counsel in the procedure necessitates close scrutiny and criticism. Opponents of anonymous juries argue that the procedure restricts meaningful voir dire, (questioning of the jury panel), and thereby undermines the defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. Critics also claim that jurors interpret their anonymity as proof of the defendant's criminal proclivity, thereby subverting the presumption of innocence.
However, consistent with due process and the sixth amendment, the trial judge may refuse to ask prospective jurors any questions not reasonably calculated to expose biases or prejudices relevant to the case. Although addresses and group affiliations may indicate significant potential for bias, attorneys do not have an unfettered right to this information in every circumstance. Denying access to these facts may indeed constrain an attorney's ability to assemble an ideal jury, but it violates no constitutional right
One function of the fourth paragraph of the passage is to
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